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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under the Court's order issued pursuant to Rule 5, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, granting the Petitioner leave to appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Respondent takes issue with the Petitioner's Statement of Issues and Standards of
Review. First, the Petitioner's Statement fails to provide any "citation to the record showing
that the issue was preserved in the trial court" as required by Rule 24(a)(5(A), Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. The only reference with regard to preservation of issues is to the
Petitioner's motion for protective order. Such motion asserted only that the material sought
through the Respondent's discovery requests was not relevant and was being sought only to
harass and embarrass the Petitioner. Second, the only issues properly appealed and before
this Court deal specifically with the trial court's denial of the Petitioner's motion for
protective order and do not include whether a basis exists for modifying custody in this case
or whether the Utah courts should adopt a new standard for determining custody where
initial custody determinations are uncontested. Based thereon, the only issues properly
presented for review are as follows.
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering the Petitioner to respond to

discovery requests propounded by the Respondent and seeking information regarding
Petitioner's extramarital sexual activities for periods both before and after the parties'
divorce, where the Respondent was not aware of such activities at the time of divorce and

where such fads were not before the court at the time the court approved the parties'
stipulated custody arrangements?
The standard of review applied to determine whether the trial court erred in requiring
that the Petitioner provide such discovery, is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404 (Utah App. 1999); Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952
P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering the Petitioner to respond to

discovery requests propounded by the Respondent and seeking information regarding
Petitioner's extramarital sexual activities for periods both before and after the parties'
divorce, due to the court's reasoning that such information is relevant with regard to the
Petitioner's moral conduct and parenting ability?
The standard of review applied to determine whether the trial court erred in requiring
that the Petitioner provide such discovery, is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404 (Utah App. 1999); Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952
P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent does not oppose the Petitioner's Statement of the Case, except with
regard to paragraph 12. As is apparent from the trial court's ruling (Record at 597 - 604),
while the trial court did refer to language in the case of Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah
1989), the trial court did not rely solely upon such case as a basis for its ruling. The trial
court further did not rely upon a ruling that the Respondent was not required to show a
2

change of circumstances at trial of tins \

ather relied upon the fact that newly

discovered evidence relevant to this matter was not before the court at the time of divorce
(Record at 200).
In addition to the above, the crux of this matter revolves around information obtained
by the Respondent in late 2000, which prompted the filing of the counter-petition below
seeking a change of custody. In late 2000, the Respondent came into possession of excerpts
from the diary of

irty which evidence an extramarital sexual relationship between

the Petitioner and a man in Cedar City, Utah, lioni ;u least October 1996 through December
1996. Such diary entries refer to the Petitioner arriving at the mans home, having sexual
relations with him, and spending the night there, all while Petitioner and Respondent were
still married. Additionally, these relations included times when the man's children were in
the home and while the man's live-in girlfriend was present in the home The Petitioner
knew of the relationship between the man and the live-in girlfriend at the time and knew that
the man maintained sexual relationships with numerous other women at the same time.
Additionally, the excerpts refer to certain I illuo itul other mechanisms which the man used
to "mark" his women. Petitioner had one such tattoo and other "marking" before the
Petitioner and Respondent divorced but explained to the Respondent that the "marking" was
done by a lesbian friend of the Petitioner's. Petitioner repeatedly denied any extramarital
sexual involvement both before and after the parties' divorce. I he diary entries are found
in the record at pages 520 - 536. The Respondent was investigating the information he had
obtained at the i

he Petitioner fih i her petition to modify in the trial court.
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This appeal deals with discovery issues and only discovery issues. However, the
analysis in the Petitioner's brief is suited to a case where the Petitioner is contesting a trial
court's modification of a custody decree. Indeed, the Petitioner goes so far as to seek this
Court's abandonment of the current standards applicable to all cases where a modification
of custody is sought after a nonlitigated decree is entered. Thus, Petitioner has turned a
simple discovery matter into a crusade for custody reform. Additionally, Petitioner's
arguments extend only to discovery sought for matters occurring prior to the parties' original
divorce and subsequent modification of the custody decree. Yet Petitioner summarily asserts
that the trial court's order requiring disclosure of extramarital relations after such dates
should also, for some reason, be reversed.
The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in requiring production of the discovery
requested by the Respondent because such evidence is "clearly irrelevant to establish the
prerequisite change in circumstances" (Petitioner's Brief page 9); the trial court "failed to
make . . . findings [that a material change in circumstances has occurred] (Petitioner's Brief
page 10), the trial court "failed to find any evidence that any asserted change in
circumstances was material, and . . . Respondent has failed to provide such evidence"
(Petitioner's Brief page 11), the trial court "erroneously found that material evidence was not
before the court issuing the decree . . . ." (Petitioner's Brief page 11), and the trial court
"conclude[d] that the disputed evidence was material to the children's welfare without
finding that there was evidence to support such a conclusion." (Petitioner's Brief page 12).
4

In essence, Petitioner argues that the trial court should have required the Respondent to prove
his case in support of a change of custody before the Petitioner was required to provide the
Respondent with the requested discovery. Petitioner's arguments are apparently based upon
Petitioner's assumption that the Respondent cannot prevail in his action in chief and thus the
trial court should not ha\ e i eqi lired the pi oduction of the requested discovery. However, the
requested discovery is essential to a determination of whether there is a material change in
circumstances and whether the best interests of the children will be served by a change in
custody.

etitioner's arguments would require the Respondent to prove a change in

circumstances before being allowed

^tain discovery as to the true nature of the

circumstances at the time of the divorce and since. Such is not reqitired. The trial court
properly noted that although the court was ordering that the discovery be provided, "the
burden remains upon Respondenl to prove the allegations, but both sides must be allowed
discovery to prepare the case." (Record at 601). Ihus, the day for Petitioner's arguments
with regard to the test applied to the instant custody modification will be at a trial ot the
matter, i

appeal of a discovery order.
ARGUMENTS

I.

The Trial Court Properly Applied Existing Case Law In Denying
Petitioner's Motion For Protective Order,

Urn Supivme Court has described the policy behind our discovery rules. In Ellis v.
Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39 (Utah 1967), the Court noted that the purpose of the discovery
procedure in the Rules of Civil Procedure is:
5

to make procedure as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any
useless ritual, undue rigidities or technicalities . . . and to remove elements of
surprise or trickery so the parties and the court can determine the facts and
resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible In accord
with this is the beginning policy statement in Rule 1(a): that the rules "shall be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action."
In State v. Petty, 412 P.2d 914 (Utah 1966), 1he Court also noted this same purpose and then
stated
One of the means of accomplishing this is to permit discovery of information
which will aid in eliminating noncontroversial matters, and in identifying,
narrowing, and clarifying the issues on which contest may prove to be
necessary. Insofar as discovery will serve this purpose it should be liberally
permitted.
Thus, anything bearing on the issue of custody modification or which would render that issue
moot, narrow the issues, or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with regard to that
issue is disco\ erable. The Petitioner filed her motion seeking a protective order claiming that
the discovery sought with regard to any past and on-going extramarital sexual relations of
the Petitioner was irrelevant and sought only to embarrass and harass the Petitioner. It was
in that context that the trial court correctly entered its order denying the Petitioner's motion.
In determining what is "relevant to the subject matter" of a case and thus discoverable
under Rule 26(b), the Utah Supreme Court noted
In considering what is the "subject matter" of a lawsuit we keep in mind that
the ultimate objective of any lawsuit is a determination of the dispute between
the parties; and that the earlier and easier this can be accomplished, with
justice to both sides, the better for all concerned. Whatever helps to attain that
objective is "relevant" to the lawsuit.
Ellis v. Gilbert, Id
6
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not before the court (citations omitted), or if the circumstances pertaining to
the decree had subsequently changed, so that a new determination should be
made based on a full development of all material facts.
Elmer at 604. What the trial court did in ruling on the Petitioner's discovery motion was
exactly what the Utah Supreme Court stated in Elmer. The trial court determined that the
requested discovery was relevant and should be provided as such information was not before
the court at the time of the decree.
Additionally, the Respondent has asserted a substantial change in circumstances in
this case. Shortly before the Petitioner filed her petition to modify the parties' stipulated
decree, the Respondent was provided with information regarding extramarital sexual
activities of the Petitioner. However, prior to and after the parties' divorce, the Respondent
had heard rumors regarding alleged extramarital sexual activities by the Petitioner and
confronted the Petitioner. The Petitioner at all times denied such activities as depicted in the
newly discovered evidence. The Petitioner's denial of such activities and the Respondent's
reliance thereon was one of the material facts relied upon by the Respondent in not
contesting the current custody arrangement. If such activities had been known, Respondent
would have contested custody in the Petitioner and sought sole custody (Record at 510 511).
As was also properly found by the trial court, the information requested in the
Respondent's discovery requests as to the Petitioner's past and current extramarital sexual
activities is certainly "relevant" to the subject matter of this case under the Utah Code. In
ordering that the Petitioner provide the requested discovery, the trial court noted, "Utah Code
8
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subsequent modification, the information could have been obtained through discovery. Thus,
the information is admittedly relevant. However, the Petitioner now asserts that, due only
to the passage of time and the Petitioner's continued denial of any extramarital sexual
relationships, the information has somehow become irrelevant. Such is not logical. The
Respondent's reliance on the Petitioner's continued reassurances that extramarital sexual
activities were not occurring should not now work to her advantage by somehow claiming
that the information should have been sought earlier. At the time of the original divorce, the
parties had agreed to joint legal custody with equal time to the children. Certainly some
amount of trust had to be in place and the Respondent trusted the Petitioner's statements
denying sexual relationships existed. Additionally, the Respondent was in the position of
having the children one-half of the time, a situation which no longer exists.
IL

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion As Argued By The Petitioner
Since No Evidence Was Admitted,

In her second argument, as summarized in her brief, the Petitioner, asserts that "the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the best interests of the children
before determining that there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances
since the entry of the decree." (Petitioner's Brief page 28) (Emphasis supplied). The error
in Petitioner's theory is that the trial court did not "admit" any evidence. The trial court
merely ruled that the Petitioner has to supply Respondent with the requested discovery. The
issue as to whether any of the information obtained by the Respondent through discovery
will be admitted into evidence will be made only at trial. As stated above, the requested
10

discovery certainly comes within the parameters of Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and therefore, the trial court's order denying the Petitioner's motion for protective order was
proper.
The Petitioner argues that Utah case law requires a strict application of the changed
circumstances test to this case despite the court's ruling in the Elmer case. Petitioner asserts
that cases subsequent to Elmer limit the court's ruling in Elmer to cases where custody is
determined by default. Initially, it must be stated that such argument is, again, not directed
or applicable to the discovery issue on appeal before this Court. Such argument is more
appropriate after or in connection with a determination by a trial court of what evidence will
be admitted regarding a custody modification and in what order such evidence should be
taken. In any event, the Petitioner's alleged modification of the Elmer ruling has not
occurred. Despite Petitioner's contention, in Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App.
1991), this Court applied the Elmer rationale to the case before it even though such case
involved a stipulated custody decree rather than one entered by default. In Crouse v. Crouse,
817P.2d836 (Utah App. 1991), this Court again upheld the Elmer rule in a case dealing with
a stipulated custody decree. In that case, the trial court had not taken evidence on the best
interests of the child as part of the evidence relating to a change in circumstances. This
Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by choosing not to allow such
evidence to be presented prior to a determination of a change in circumstances. However,
this Court at no time abandoned or ruled improper the use of the Elmer rule in such cases.
Finally, in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991),this Court again
11

addressed a case involving a requested modification of a stipulated custody decree. In that
case, this Court again applied the Elmer rule. "We find that even under the Elmer
evidentiary standard, the changes are not sufficient to constitute a substantial or material
change of circumstances." Id. at 479. Thus, this Court has not, and should not, abandon the
Elmer rule or require more of a showing for its application other than that the decree sought
to be modified was not litigated. Thus, the trial court's ruling in this case should be upheld.
Even were the Court to find validity in Petitioner's argument that the Elmer rule
should not be applied to cases resolved by stipulation, it would have no impact on the
discovery issues presented here. The application of the rule, again, deals with evidence
presented at trial and the manner of such presentation and is not a limitation on discovery.
However, Petitioner argues that based upon the holding in Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, as
interpreted in Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 and Walton, 814 P.2d 619,
unless "exceptional circumstances" exist, the modified rule under Elmer does not apply to
a custody modification sought with regard to a stipulated custody decree. Petitioner wrongly
asserts that exceptional circumstances are defined by the courts as only "an initial custody
award premised on a temporary condition, a choice between marginal custody arrangements,
a default case," or where " the refusal to change custody will result in the continuation of
custody in a parent who is indifferent to, or even destructive of, the child's welfare."
(Petitioner's Brief page 28 - 29). In reality, the cases cited by the Petitioner do not require
a showing of "exceptional circumstances" but refer to certain times when it may be
appropriate to require a showing of what this Court refers to as "exceptional criteria" before
12

considering evidence of the best interests of a child as part of the evidence establishing
changed circumstances. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, such cases do not define what
constitute exceptional criteria but merely give examples of some criteria which may qualify
as such. In the Petitioner's cited cases, this Court gives no absolute definition but rather
describes exceptional criteria as "such as an initial custody award premised on a temporary
condition, a choice between marginal custody arrangements, or a default decree." Crouse,
817 P.2d at 840, Cummings, 821 P.2d at 478, Walton, 814 P.2d at 623.
It is obvious that this Court in the above cases did not intend to limit what constitutes
exceptional criteria. It is also obvious that evidence of extramarital relationships which was
not known to the Respondent and not before the court at the time of the original decree
herein or the modification thereof, constitute such exceptional criteria for proceeding under
Elmer. Based thereon, the trial court's order that the Petitioner herein respond to discovery
with regard to prior and ongoing extramarital sexual relationships is certainly within the trial
court's discretion.
III.

The Trial Court Properly Found That Material Evidence Was Not Before
The Court At The Time Of The Original Decree And Modification.

The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding that information regarding
the Petitioner's extramarital sexual activities was not before the court at the time of the
original decree or the subsequent modification.

However, it is undisputed that such

information was not before the court. The reason it was not before the court was due to the
Petitioner's repeated assurance that the rumors regarding possible extramarital sexual
13

activities were false. The parties had worked long at trying to first save their seventeen year
marriage and then at reaching a fair resolution of their divorce proceedings with the least
impact on the parties' children. Based upon the Petitioner's repeated assurances, the
Respondent chose to trust the Petitioner rather than chase rumors which Petitioner denied.
It is clear that the propounded discovery is intended to bring before the trial court the true
circumstances at the time of the parties' original divorce and those existing since such time
so that a full and fair determination may be made by the trial court with regard to whether
changed circumstances exist and the best interests of the parties' children.
IV.

This Court Should Not Modify The Existing Rules Nor Abandon Existing
Precedent Establishing The Standards To Be Applied With Regard To
Modifications Of Stipulated Custody Decrees.

The Petitioner's final argument is that this Court, in determining the propriety of a
trial court's discovery order, should rewrite the existing standards applicable to modifications
to stipulated custody decrees. This is not the context in which to make such a modification,
especially in light of the fact that no determination has as yet been made in the trial court as
to whether either the Petitioner's or Respondent's requested modifications should be granted,
nor what evidence is admissible with regard to such claims. If such an argument is made at
all on appeal, it should be made by Petitioner only after an adverse ruling applying the
standard thai Petitioner now seeks to change. Additionally, in light of the well established
history and rationale surrounding the existing Elmer standard, such standard should remain.

14

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly acted within its discretion in denying the Petitioner's motion
for protective order and requiring the Petitioner to disclose information regarding the
Petitioner's prior and on-going extramarital sexual activities. Such information is relevant
to this case, to whether changed circumstances exist, and to whether a change in custody
would be in the best interest of the parties' children. Such ends the analysis of this case.
The Respondent should be allowed such discovery in order to establish the true
circumstances of the Petitioner's extramarital sexual activities both before the divorce and
on an on-going basis. Such allowance certainly comports with the overriding interest
involved in this case and as enumerated by the Petitioner's cited authorities, that being the
best interest of the parties' children. Based thereon, the Respondent respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling denying the Petitioner's motion for protective
order and requiring that the requested discovery be provided.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of May, 2003.

Gary G^Kuhlmann
Respondent and Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on May 12, 2003, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed First Class mail, postage prepaid to Chad J. Utley, counsel for
Petitioner, at 189 North Main Street, P.O. Box 2408, St. George, Utah 84771-2408.
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